Keys in the Clouds: Auditable Multi-device Access to Cryptographic
  Credentials by Kurnikov, Arseny et al.
Keys in the Clouds: Auditable Multi-device
Access to Cryptographic Credentials
Arseny Kurnikov
Aalto University, Finland
arseny.kurnikov@aalto.fi
Andrew Paverd
Aalto University, Finland
andrew.paverd@ieee.org
Mohammad Mannan
Concordia University, Canada
m.mannan@concordia.ca
N. Asokan
Aalto University, Finland
asokan@acm.org
ABSTRACT
Personal cryptographic keys are the foundation of many secure
services, but storing these keys securely is a challenge, especially if
they are used from multiple devices. Storing keys in a centralized
location, like an Internet-accessible server, raises serious security
concerns (e.g. server compromise). Hardware-based Trusted Execu-
tion Environments (TEEs) are a well-known solution for protecting
sensitive data in untrusted environments, and are now becoming
available on commodity server platforms.
Although the idea of protecting keys using a server-side TEE
is straight-forward, in this paper we validate this approach and
show that it enables new desirable functionality. We describe the
design, implementation, and evaluation of a TEE-based Cloud Key
Store (CKS), an online service for securely generating, storing,
and using personal cryptographic keys. Using remote attestation,
users receive strong assurance about the behaviour of the CKS,
and can authenticate themselves using passwords while avoiding
typical risks of password-based authentication like password theft
or phishing. In addition, this design allows users to i) define policy-
based access controls for keys; ii) delegate keys to other CKS users
for a specified time and/or a limited number of uses; and iii) audit
all key usages via a secure audit log. We have implemented a proof
of concept CKS using Intel SGX and integrated this into GnuPG on
Linux and OpenKeychain on Android. Our CKS implementation
performs approximately 6,000 signature operations per second on
a single desktop PC. The latency is in the same order of magnitude
as using locally-stored keys, and 20x faster than smart cards.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Personal cryptographic keys are the foundation of many secure
services, such as signing or decrypting emails, signing code, authen-
ticating to remote servers, or decrypting cloud storage. However,
storing personal cryptographic keys securely often proves to be dif-
ficult for users, especially when keys must be usable from multiple
devices (e.g. PCs, smartphones, and tablets). Although we already
have various approaches for protecting personal cryptographic
keys, these have various limitations:
Password only: keys stored directly on the user’s device may be
compromised by malicious software on the device. Even if the keys
are protected by a password, either the password or the decrypted
key could be captured by malicious software (see e.g. [30]).
Device key store: storing keys in e.g. the hardware-backed
Android or iOS key store protects them from malicious software,
but this type of device key store may not be available on all the
user’s devices. Furthermore, the keys may be vulnerable while they
are being transferred between devices.
External peripherals: smart cards or USB tokens (e.g. Tre-
zor [33] and YubiKey [37]) can protect keys frommalicious software
whilst being usable from multiple devices. However, they require
additional hardware or peripherals (e.g. smart card reader), which
incur costs and may be incompatible with some devices.
It is also important to consider the availability of the keys: keys
that only exist on a single device (e.g. generated and used exclusively
within a hardware-backed device key store or smart card) would
become unavailable if the device/smart card is lost or damaged.
Storing personal cryptographic keys in a centralized location
(e.g. an Internet-connected server) solves many of the above chal-
lenges: users can authenticate and use their keys from any Internet-
connected device, and centralized servers generally have lower risk
of loss or failure than individual users’ devices. However, the prin-
cipal challenge is how to protect the keys against external attackers,
other users, and even malicious server administrators.
Password-based encryption: a naive approach is to encrypt
keys using the user’s password and download the encrypted keys to
the user’s devices when needed. However, since passwords are gen-
erally weak secrets [3], this does not provide sufficient protection
against an adversary who can obtain the encrypted keys (e.g. via
a compromised server) and will eventually be able to guess many
users’ passwords. Furthermore, the decrypted keys would still be
vulnerable to any malicious software on the user’s device.
Key splitting: another approach is to split a key into two (or
more) shares, one of which is held by the server and another by
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the user’s device (e.g. [9, 24]). In order to use the key, both the
server and the user’s devicemust cooperate. Although this approach
protects the keys against server compromise, it entails a relatively
complicated process in order to use the key from a new device (e.g.
a share of the key must be securely transferred to the new device).
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE): hardware-enforced
TEEs, like Intel SGX [18] and ARM TrustZone [31], can be used
to isolate and protect a small amount of trustworthy code and
data from all other software on the machine, including the OS
and hypervisor. Furthermore, by using remote attestation, a TEE
can provide strong assurance to remote parties about precisely
what code it is running, and can establish a secure communication
channel. Server-side TEEs are therefore a promising solution for
protecting cryptographic keys on a centralized server, and are now
becoming available in commodity server hardware [17].
Storing cryptographic keys is a well-known use case for TEEs.
However, in this paper we validate the assertion that server-side
TEEs can be used to protect personal cryptographic keys, and we
show that such a design can in fact provide several desirable features
that could not otherwise be realized. We present the design, imple-
mentation, and evaluation of a Cloud Key Store (CKS) in which keys
are generated, stored, and used exclusively within a server-side TEE.
We refer to these as protected keys. Using remote attestation, the
user receives strong assurance that she is communicating with a le-
gitimate TEE, and can establish a unilaterally-authenticated secure
communication channel directly to the TEE. The user authenti-
cates herself to the TEE by sending her username and password via
this channel (i.e. achieving mutual authentication). Password-based
authentication is still the most widespread user authentication
method [4] and can be used from any of the user’s devices. By
rate-limiting the authentication attempts for each username, the
TEE prevents password guessing attacks, even from a compromised
server. The user submits requests to the CKS, which performs the
requested operations inside the TEE, and returns the results via the
same channel.
In addition to storing keys securely and providing access from
multiple devices, the CKS also enables the following new features:
• Policy-based access control: the key owner can restrict key
use to a specific time period and/or number of uses.
• Key delegation: users can delegate access to their keys to
other users of the same CKS for either a specific time period
and/or number of uses.
• Key usage auditing: every operation performed using the
protected keys can be logged by the CKS, and a user can audit
these logs to detect any misuse of the protected keys.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We design and fully implement a Cloud Key Store (CKS) that
supports password-based user authentication, secure key gen-
eration, decryption and signature operations, policy-based ac-
cess control, key delegation, and key usage auditing (Sections 4
and 5). Our implementation uses off-the-shelf hardware, and
is available as open source software [22].
• We demonstrate the functionality of our CKS by integrating
it into two applications: GnuPG on Linux and OpenKeychain
on Android (Section 5), which we also provide as open source
software [22]. The core CKS operations do not require any
changes in the applications’ UI. The new CKS features (i.e.
delegation and auditing) are provided via a web interface, but
in future could also be integrated into the applications.
• We evaluate the security and performance of our CKS imple-
mentation, using both GnuPG on Linux and OpenKeychain
on Android (Section 6). On a single desktop CPU, our CKS
implementation can perform approximately 6,000 signature
operations per second. The average latency is in the same order
of magnitude as using an unprotected key on the local device,
and 20x faster than using a smart card.
• Finally, we present a comparison of different approaches for
managing personal cryptographic keys in terms of their se-
curity and functionality (Section 7). This shows that a CKS
outperforms alternative approaches in multiple aspects, whilst
providing additional desirable features.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Intel SGX
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [18] is one recent instantia-
tion of a TEE. SGX is a set of CPU extensions that allow applications
to define one or more enclaves that are protected from all other
software on the platform, including the operating system (OS) and
hypervisor. Data within an enclave can only be accessed from code
running within the enclave. The CPU automatically encrypts en-
clave memory before it leaves the boundary of the CPU package
(e.g. is written to DRAM) [16]. This protects the confidentiality and
integrity of the enclave’s data, even against an adversary with ac-
cess to the platform hardware. An untrusted application can invoke
functions within an enclave through pre-defined ECALLs. Enclaves
can call functions from the untrusted application via OCALLs.
When an enclave needs to persist data, it can encrypt the data
using a CPU-protected key, called a sealing key exclusively available
to that specific enclave. This sealed data can be safely stored outside
the enclave. SGX provides monotonic counters to prevent roll-back
attacks on sealed data. Finally, SGX provides remote attestation, a
process through which a remote relying party (the verifier) can
identify the precise code running inside an enclave (the prover),
and can establish a secure channel directly to the enclave. Since
well-designed enclaves contain only the minimal amount of code
necessary for their intended functionality, this code can be audited
or otherwise analysed by the verifier (or a third-party of the veri-
fier’s choosing) in order to determine that the code is trustworthy.
2.2 Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [38], and the associated OpenPGP stan-
dard (RFC4880) [6], provide a set of algorithms and procedures to
encrypt and/or authenticate data. OpenPGP is the most widely used
standard for encrypting and signing e-mail communications. For
example, Alice can use PGP to send encrypted messages to Bob,
thus protecting the confidentiality of the messages, and/or can sign
her messages to assure Bob of the integrity and authenticity of the
messages.
A major challenge in PGP is to establish a trustworthy mapping
between public keys and real-world users. This is usually achieved
using a PKI or a web of trust: a reputation system in which trusted
users vouch for the public keys of other users. Since building up
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Figure 1: Cloud Key Store architecture.
trust through this type of system takes time, revoking a key and
re-establishing trust in a new key incurs a relatively high cost.
If an attacker gets access to the user’s private key, he can decrypt
past e-mails sent to the user, and impersonate the user by generating
falsified signatures. The only way to prevent further damage is to
revoke the key. For this reason, users are recommended to instead
use subkeys for day-to-day operations, since individual subkeys
can be revoked without affecting the main user identity.
GnuPG [13] is an open-source implementation of the OpenPGP
standard. By default, GnuPG stores encrypted private keys on the
user’s local device, but it can also use keys stored on a smart card
or similar device.
3 SYSTEM MODEL AND REQUIREMENTS
3.1 System Model
Figure 1 shows the abstract system model of our CKS running in a
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) on a remote server. As we
discuss in Section 8, the CKS can also be distributed across multiple
physical or virtual servers.
Core functionality: the CKS has the ability to generate, store,
and use protected keys within the TEE. The user first runs a remote
attestation protocol to ensure that the CKS is running in a genuine
TEE, and to establish a secure channel to the TEE. Via the secure
channel, the user submits requests to the CKS, containing her user-
name, password, and the inputs for the cryptographic operation
(e.g. data to be decrypted or signed). Upon receiving a request, the
CKS checks the user’s password, performs the requested operation,
and returns the result via the secure channel.
Additional functionality: the CKS allows users to delegate
usage rights for their keys to other users for a specific period of
time and/or number of uses of the key, and to audit all operations
that have been performed using their protected keys.
3.2 Adversary model
We assume a strong adversary who has the ability to run arbitrary
code on the server with root privileges. In addition, the adversary
has full control of the network, including the ability to monitor,
drop, modify, and/or replay any network communication. We as-
sume the adversary cannot feasibly break correctly implemented
cryptographic primitives. We also assume that the adversary cannot
feasibly subvert the security guarantees of hardware-based Trusted
Execution Environments (although we discuss side-channel attacks
against TEEs in Section 6). In reality, a well-resourced adversary
may be able to subvert a hardware-based TEE, but this requires
direct physical access and would incur significant cost. Therefore,
our adversary model captures various possible scenarios, including:
• An attack and elevation of privileges against the server;
• A server operator being coerced by law enforcement;
• A malicious employee of server operator (insider threat).
In this work, we assume that users do not choose particularly weak
passwords (e.g. passwords are not in the list of the top 100 most
common passwords). This is a reasonable assumption because i) an
average password is estimated to provide approximately 20 bits of
security [3], and ii) users who are using personal cryptographic keys
are likely to be able to choose a password of reasonable strength.
3.3 Security requirements
The primary security goal of the CKS is to protect keys against
exfiltration and/or unauthorized use. Since key use is authorized
by the user’s password, the CKS must also ensure the security of
this password. Given the adversary model above, we define the
following security requirements to achieve this goal:
R1 Authentication: Protected keys can only be used or delegated
by supplying the correct password.
R2 Offline attacks: Offline guessing of the password and/or the
protected key must be infeasible.
R3 Online attacks: Online guessing of the password must be rate
limited. Online guessing of protected keys must be infeasible.
3.4 Performance Goals
Ideally, the CKS should not cause a noticeable slow-down from the
perspective of the user (e.g. compared to using a smart card), and
should maximize the throughput per server, thus minimizing the
number of servers required. We therefore define the following two
performance goals:
• Latency: The time required to perform a cryptographic oper-
ation using a protected key must be comparable or better than
that of using a key stored on a smart card.
• Throughput: The design should maximize the rate of crypto-
graphic operations performed by the server.
3.5 Deployability Goals
The ability to create and restore backups of the CKS is critical for
achieving reliable key storage. This would mitigate the impact of
failure and/or theft of the physical server hardware. The ability to
scale horizontally is also necessary to ensure the availability of the
CKS, even during periods of peak demand. It should be possible
to dynamically increase/decrease the number of CKS servers on
demand. However, implemented naively, both of these capabilities
could undermine security requirement R3, because the adversary
could abuse them to increase his rate of password guessing. We
therefore define the following deployability goals:
• Backup and recovery: The server should support secure
backup and recovery procedures to mitigate the risk of hard-
ware failures.
• Scalability: The server should support secure yet dynamic
horizontal scalability (e.g. it should be load balancer friendly).
3
Table 1: Cloud Key Store operations
Name Input Output
create_user uid, new_pswd, new_reset_pswd –
pswd_reset uid, reset_pswd, new_pswd –
gen_key uid, pswd, key_attributes key_id
import_key uid, pswd, key_data key_id
pksign uid, pswd, key_id, msg_hash signature
pkdecrypt uid, pswd, key_id, enc_msg decryption
set_policy uid, pswd, key_id, key_policy –
delegate uid, pswd, key_id, delegatees, policy –
undelegate uid, pswd, key_id, delegatees –
audit uid, pswd, key_id, time_period key_log
delete_key uid, pswd, key_id –
4 DESIGN
In this section we present the design of the Cloud Key Store (CKS),
focusing on the challenges and our solutions. The operations that
can be performed by the CKS are listed in Table 1, and an overview
of the interaction between the user and the CKS is depicted in
Figure 2. In reality, the human user would use some type of client-
side software to interact with the CKS (e.g. GnuPG on Linux or
OpenKeychain on Android). For clarity of explanation and without
loss of generality, we simply use the term user to refer to the human
user and all client-side software.
4.1 Establishing a Secure Channel
To establish trust in the CKS, the user must receive strong assurance
that the CKS is running in a genuine TEE, and that only the CKS
software is running in the TEE. This is achieved through remote
attestation. Since we only require unilateral authentication of the
TEE towards the user, we use the efficient remote attestation proto-
col proposed by the SafeKeeper system [21]. This allows the user to
verify the TEE, establish a secure channel, and issue a request all in
a single message round-trip. In this section we illustrate the proto-
col using a discrete logarithm Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement
protocol, but in practice any equivalent key agreement protocol
could be used (e.g. Elliptic curve DH).
Before any users connect, the TEE generates a private key a and
a DH public key дa , where д is a generator for a suitable DH group.
All operations are performed in this group (i.e. mod n, where n is
the group size). Using the platform functionality, the TEE generates
a quote containing this public key and full details of the software
running in the TEE. This provides assurance that only the specified
software has access to the private key corresponding to дa .
When a user first connects to the CKS, she requests this quote.
The user verifies the authenticity of the quote, and that the public
key supplied by the CKS (or a hash thereof) is included in the
quote. The user then generates her own private key b and DH
public key дb , and sends these to the CKS. At this point the user
has established a shared secret key K = дab with the CKS, and
unilaterally authenticated the CKS. The user encrypts subsequent
requests to the enclave with the derived key.
User Cloud Key Store
gen: дa ,
quote(дa )
request_quote
дa , quote(дa )
check_quote ,
gen: дb , K = дab
дb , {uid,pswd, inputs}K
check_password ,
crypto_operation{outputs}K
Figure 2: Sequence of interactions between the user and the
Cloud Key Store.
4.2 Authenticating the User
Once the secure channel has been established, the communication
between the user and CKS follows a typical request-response model.
When a request is received, the CKS decrypts the request, looks
up the username, and compares the supplied password. To protect
against online password-guessing attacks, the TEE limits the rate
of authentication attempts using an exponential back-off algorithm.
When the user authentication fails, the CKS temporarily disables
further authentication attempts for that particular user account for
a user-defined duration. If subsequent authentication attempts also
fail, the duration between attempts is increased exponentially. A
successful authentication resets the duration to its initial value. As
discussed in Section 6.1, the rate-limiting mechanism in the TEE is
primarily intended to prevent a compromised server from perform-
ing online guessing attacks against the CKS. The server operator
would also implement their own rate-limiting mechanism outside
the TEE to prevent external adversaries from causing a denial of
service attack by abusing the CKS rate-limiting mechanism.
4.3 New Users and Password Recovery
When a user first accesses the system, she uses the create_user
function and supplies a new username, a password, and a reset
password. The username and password must be included in all sub-
sequent requests. If the user forgets her password, or accidentally
reveals it to an adversary, she can send a pswd_reset request using
her reset password. The limitation of this mechanism is that it still
requires the user to store the reset password securely. However,
since this password is not used frequently, it should be feasible
for the user to store it securely, e.g. written down in a safe. Other
password recovery mechanisms like email may be possible, but
would require the user to trust additional services.
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4.4 Policy-based Access Control
If the authentication succeeds, the CKS performs the requested
operation. The user can generate a new key or import a key using
the gen_key and import_key functions respectively. Every key has
an associated key usage policy, which defines:
• the username of the key’s owner;
• what types of operations may be performed using the key;
• the key expiration time;
• the remaining number of operations.
The user can sign or decrypt data using the pksign and pkdecrypt
functions respectively. Every cryptographic operation is checked
against the key’s usage policy. If the policy check succeeds, the
CKS performs the cryptographic operation and returns the outputs
to the user via the secure channel.
The key owner can always change a key’s usage policy using the
set_policy function, but this policy is still checked even for the
key owner to prevent accidental use of the key (e.g. using a signing
key for a decryption operation). The user can delete any keys she
owns using the delete_key function.
4.5 Key Delegation
A user can delegate access to protected keys to other users using the
delegate function. The delegator specifies the key to be delegated
and the usernames of the delegatees, as well as any restrictions
on the delegation (i.e. duration and/or number of uses). For each
delegatee, the CKS first checks that the restrictions match the main
key usage policy (i.e. a key cannot be delegated beyond its expiry
date). If this check passes, the CKS adds an additional section to
the key’s usage policy specifying the username of the delegatee,
the permitted operations, the duration of the delegation, and the
remaining number of operations. The CKS may add multiple addi-
tional sections if the key is delegated to multiple users.
When the delegatee attempts to use this key, the CKS checks
the operation against the additional section of the key’s usage
policy. The delegatee cannot modify the key’s usage policy. In
our current design, the delegatee also cannot delegate these keys
further, however, it would be reasonably straightforward to allow
this functionality through our flexible key usage policy.
4.6 Key Usage Auditing
The CKS maintains a secure log of all operations performed using
protected keys. Before performing an operation, an entry is added
to the log specifying the time1 of the operation, the key used, the
type of operation, the input values, and the output values. The user
can obtain the log using the audit command, which takes a key
identifier and time period as parameters, and returns all log entries
for that key during the specified time period. If a user notices oper-
ations that she did not perform, she can take remedial actions such
as resetting the password. Assuming the user’s recovery password
has not been compromised, the user does not need to revoke the
key – changing the main password would be sufficient to prevent
the adversary from using the key. If the adversary has delegated
the key, this can be reversed using the undelegate function.
1This requires a TEE that provides trusted time capabilities.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented the CKS as an Intel SGX enclave running on the
server, and we modified two applications to use our CKS: GnuPG
on Linux, and OpenKeychain on Android. In this section we sum-
marize the main technical details of our implementations, which
are available as open source software [22].
5.1 Enclave
The enclave’s API consists of 3 ECALLs: initialize, process, and
shutdown, as explained in the following subsections. The enclave
maintains a key database containing the username and password
of each user, all cryptographic keys generated or imported by the
users, and the associated metadata like the key usage policies.
5.1.1 Enclave initialization. The initialize ECALL causes the
enclave to generate a fresh DH key pair, pre-generate the informa-
tion required for remote attestation, unseal the database of keys,
and load this into the enclave’s memory. As explained in Section 4.1,
our design uses a more efficient remote attestation protocol than the
default 4-message protocol provided in the SGX SDK. To ensure that
it has unsealed the latest version of the database, the enclave com-
pares the version number and version nonce in the database against
the value of a hardware monotonic counter. If there is a mismatch,
the enclave raises an error and aborts operation. Before the enclave
begins to process requests, it increments the hardware monotonic
counter, to indicate that the state of the database may have changed.
This prevents the adversary from crashing the enclave and attempt-
ing to restore even the latest version of the database, since the state
of the database may have changed.
5.1.2 User authentication. The process ECALL is used for all
CKS operations. Compared to creating separate ECALLs for each
CKS operation, this design means that the enclave’s interface does
not need to be changed, even if new CKS functions are added. This
ECALL takes as input an opaque data buffer, the length of the buffer,
and the public DH key of the requesting party.
When the enclave receives a request, it first completes the DH
key agreement using the public key supplied by the user, and then
decrypts the message. After decryption, the enclave retrieves the
username and password from the map of registered users and com-
pares them to the provided values. As explained in Section 4.2,
failed authentication attempts cause the enclave to temporarily
disable authentication attempts for a user-defined duration, that
is exponentially-increasing with subsequent failed attempts. If the
authentication succeeds, the enclave parses the request to obtain
the required operation.
5.1.3 Signing and decryption. Our prototype implementation
supports both signing and decryption operations using either RSA
or Elliptic Curve cryptography. For RSA, we support the key size
of 3072 bits. We support SHA-256 for hashing. For Elliptic Curve
cryptography, we use the curve secp256r1. Other algorithms and
key sizes can be easily added to the enclave implementation.
5.1.4 Delegation and trusted time. In addition to the username
and password of the key owner, the delegation function takes as
input the username of the delegatee, and the delegation policy that
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can specify the duration and/or the maximum number of uses al-
lowed. To enforce the time-limited delegation, our enclave uses
the SGX Trusted Time API. The sgx_get_trusted_time function
returns the current time relative to an arbitrary but fixed reference
point [19]. This reference point is guaranteed to remain unchanged
as long as the time_source_nonce does not change. For delegation,
there is no need to synchronize SGX and wall-clock times because
the enclave measures a time period starting from the point of pro-
cessing the delegation request. The enclave stores the expected
time_source_nonce value and checks this whenever the time is
checked. If this value changes, the enclave raises an error and re-
fuses to process requests, since an adversary could have modified
the platform’s hardware clock.
5.1.5 Auditing and time synchronization. Before performing any
cryptographic operation the enclave creates an entry in the key
usage log. The log is protected in a similar way to the key database.
Creating the log entry before performing the operation ensures
that every operation will be logged. In the worst case, the adversary
could interrupt the enclave between creating the log entry and
performing the operation, leaving an additional entry in the log.
This can easily be detected by the user.
When a user wishes to audit the key usage, she requests the log
entries for a specified time period. The enclave scans the log and
returns the entries with timestamps in the given time period. Each
log entry contains the timestamp and the key identifier of the key
that was used. In this case, it is desirable to synchronize SGX time
to wall-clock time because the log entries contain individual points
in time. When the CKS is first created (i.e. before any users have
been added), the server operator is given a once-off opportunity
to specify a time offset value for the enclave. This is intended to
synchronize SGX time to a specific wall-clock time reference point
(e.g. Unix time). This is purely a convenience feature and does not
have any security implications. If the server operator provides a
different offset, users of this CKS will still see consistent time points
relative to a different reference point.
5.1.6 Enclave shutdown/restart. The shutdown ECALL causes
the enclave to persist all important data in preparation for the
enclave to be restarted or the platform rebooted. The enclave stops
processing requests and seals the current state of the key database,
including a version number and version nonce obtained from one of
the enclave’s hardware monotonic counters. The sealed database
must be provided to the enclave when it is restarted.
5.1.7 Irrecoverable errors. In the following situations, the en-
clave cannot recover without potentially compromising the security
guarantees of the system:
• If the system’s hardware clock is changed, the enclave cannot
determine whether operations satisfy the key usage policy.
• If an incorrect version of the sealed database is provided during
initialization, the enclave cannot safely use this because an
unknown number of changes could have been lost.
In the above cases, the enclave raises an error and refuses to pro-
cess any requests. In a real deployment, the CKS service would be
distributed across multiple enclaves, such that failure of any single
enclave does not affect the overall availability of the system (see
Section 8). Note that a compromised server operator can always
perform a denial of service attack against the system by simply
refusing to process network packets or run the enclave.
5.2 GnuPG integration
We integrated our CKS into GnuPG as a replacement for the original
smart card daemon. GnuPG has a modular architecture in which
the main process provides the user interface but contacts a GnuPG
agent for the backend operations. The agent provides a common in-
terface to perform cryptographic operations and key management,
regardless of where the keys are stored. For example, when using a
smart card, GnuPG starts the smart card daemon in the background
and uses this daemon to perform the cryptographic operations. We
did not extend the existing smart card daemon to communicate
with the CKS, but rather we implemented our own CKS daemon,
which provides the same interface as the smart card daemon. This
design choice gives finer control of the daemon operation and will
allow us to in future integrate the additional features offered by the
CKS (e.g. key delegation, auditing) into GnuPG.
All messages exchanged between the users and the CKS are
encoded using S-expressions [25], a flexible and efficient tree-based
data structure. GnuPG uses S-expressions internally when it utilizes
its cryptographic library libgcrypt. Additionally we implemented
an HTTP transport to communicate with the CKS.
GnuPG components communicate with one another via a pro-
tocol called Assuan [35]. This is a simple text-based protocol in
which each line corresponds to one request or response. The first
word in the line specifies the command and the arguments follow
separated by white-space. For example, when exporting the key
to the smart card, the Assuan request line consists of the keyword
KEYDATA followed by the encoded key data. Our new CKS daemon
performs the following operations:
(1) When started, request the quote from the remote enclave
and verify this using the Intel Attestation Service (IAS).
(2) Generate a new DH key pair and calculate the shared key
with the enclave.
(3) Start Assuan server and wait for requests from the GnuPG
agent.
(4) Dispatch the commands from the agent to the corresponding
command handlers.
(5) If the command is security sensitive, the daemon launches a
PIN entry program to request the user’s password.
(6) Encrypt the buffer containing the operation and its argu-
ments with the shared key established via remote attestation.
(7) Send the encrypted buffer to the enclave for processing.
(8) Decrypt the enclave’s response and pass the result back to
the agent.
Our GnuPG integration does not require any changes to the
GnuPG UI. When using a CKS protected key, the user’s password
is requested in the same way as GnuPG would request the user’s
PIN when using a smart card. Thus the core CKS operations (i.e.
key generation, signing, and decryption) can all be carried out from
within GnuPG. For the additional CKS features (i.e. delegation and
auditing), we provide a simple client-side web app that communi-
cates with the enclave as described above and allows the user to
issue delegation commands and inspect the key usage log.
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5.3 OpenKeychain integration
Following a similar pattern as for GnuPG, we integrated the CKS
into the OpenKeychain [29] application for Android. Although
there is a version of GnuPG for Android [11], this is not being
actively maintained, and has not been updated in the past three
years. Therefore we decided to target OpenKeychain. By default,
OpenKeychain assumes that keys will be stored locally on the
device, but it also supports smart cards.
Similarly to the integration with GnuPG described above, the
smart card functionality of OpenKeychain can be changed to com-
municate with our CKS, so we omit the details. No changes to the
app’s UI are required to support the core CKS functionality.
6 EVALUATION
6.1 Security
We analyse the security of our solution based on the requirements
defined in Section 3.3, and we discuss various other attacks and
their mitigations.
R1 Authentication: By the design of our enclave, the protected
keys can only be used if a valid password is provided. Since the
user attests the enclave before she generates or imports keys, she
can be sure that it will always perform this authentication step.
R2 Offline attacks: Whenever the key database leaves the
boundary of the enclave, it is sealed using the enclave’s sealing key.
This prevents offline attacks against the passwords or stored keys.
R3 Online attacks: A compromised server can attempt to per-
form an online password guessing attack against the CKS, by pre-
tending to be a legitimate user. Correctly guessing a user’s password
would allow the adversary to use that user’s protected keys. The
rate-limiting mechanism (Section 4.2) makes it infeasible even for a
compromised server to mount a successful online guessing attack.
Password compromise: Even if the adversary learns the user’s
password, he cannot exfiltrate keys from the CKS. He can perform
operations using the keys until the user detects it via auditing, but
when the key owner (i.e. the original user) resets her password,
using her recovery password, there is no need to revoke her key,
since the adversary will no longer be able to access this key using
the password he obtained. If the adversary has delegated the key to
other users, the key owner will see this from the audit log, and can
revoke these delegations using the delete_delegation function.
Audit log attacks: Since the enclave creates a log entry before
performing any operation, the only way for an adversary to corrupt
the log is to prevent the enclave from performing the operation
after the log entry was created. However, this only allows the
adversary to add spurious events to the log. The user can easily
detect these because he would not receive the result of the requested
operation. However it is not possible for the adversary to perform
any operation without entries appearing in the log.
SGX side-channel attacks: SGX is known to be vulnerable to
different side-channel attacks, including memory access pattern
attacks [32, 34, 36], cache attacks [5, 15], and branch shadowing at-
tacks [23]. Protecting the user identity is not a security requirement
because an adversary can infer it by other means (i.e observing the
IP addresses). The protected keys are not vulnerable to side-channel
attacks because we perform all cryptographic operations using the
recommended Intel libraries for cryptographic operations, which
offer state-of-the-art protection against SGX side-channel attacks.
Normally the identity of the user is only known to the enclave
since the username is only included in the encrypted buffer. How-
ever, by monitoring the enclave’s memory access pattern, an adver-
sary may be able to infer whether two requests originated from the
same user. Nevertheless, in a real-world deployment, the adversary
would probably be able to infer this by other means, such as the
source IP addresses of the requests. Therefore, protecting the user
identity is not a security requirement.
Denial of service: The various protection mechanisms included
in our enclave could be used by a compromised server to cause a
denial of service attack against the CKS. However, this attack is
not in scope because a compromised server could mount this type
of attack in various other ways (e.g. dropping network packets or
simply refusing to run the enclave).
6.2 Performance
We evaluate the performance of the CKS in terms of the throughput
and memory consumption of the enclave, and the latency intro-
duced from the user’s perspective. The key generation and import
operations are not benchmarked, as they are not executed often, so
they do not have a significant impact on the user experience.
Enclave throughput: To measure the overall throughput of
the CKS, we benchmarked our implementation on an Intel Core
i5-6500 3.20 GHz CPU with 8GB of RAM running Ubuntu 16.04 and
the Intel SGX SDK version 2.1. Over 10 experiments, the average
time required to perform 10,000 signature operations using the
secp256r1 curve was 1,667 ms (±91 ms). This gives an effective rate
of approximately 6,000 signature operations per second, although
it is likely that server-class CPUs would achieve higher throughput.
Throughput for decryption operations is similar.
Enclave memory: The memory footprint depends heavily on
the key policies, but a typical user record would consist of 600-700
bytes for an RSA key of length 3072 bits. So an enclave can serve
100,000 users consuming 100 Megabytes of heap memory.
Latency: To evaluate the impact on the user experience, we
measured the latency of a signing operation with and without the
CKS. We ran GnuPG on an Intel Core i5-6500 3.20 GHz CPU with
8 GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04. We ran OpenKeychain on a
Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge+ with an Exynos 7420 Octa-core CPU
(4x2.1 GHz Cortex-A57 and 4x1.5 GHz Cortex-A53) and 4 GB of
RAM, running Android 7.0. The CKS was run on the same machine
described above, and all results are the average over 10 experiments.
As the GnuPG baseline, we measured the time required to cre-
ate an RSA 3072 bit signature using a key on a GnuPG smart
card, attached via a USB card reader. The average latency was
1,282 ms (±5 ms). We measured the same signature operation when
using CKS from GnuPG. To remove the variability of network la-
tency, we ran the GnuPG client and the CKS enclave on the same
physical machine communicating over localhost. The average time
required to create the signature was 15 ms (±1 ms).
As the OpenKeychain baseline, we measured the time required
to create an RSA 3072 bit signature using an unprotected key in
the device. The average latency was 37 ms (±4 ms). To measure the
latency of OpenKeychain using CKS whilst removing the network
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latency, we connected the Android device to the PC running the
CKS enclave via a USB connection. The average time required to
create the signature was 24 ms (±2 ms).
All of the abovemeasurements intentionally exclude the network
latency, since this will depend on the type of network to which
the user is connected. To estimate network latency, we performed
an HTTP ping of Amazon Web Service (AWS) regions using the
CloudPing tool [8]. On both a wired network connection and a
4G mobile network, the latency to the nearest three AWS regions
(Ireland, London, and Frankfurt) was in the order of 50ms. Assuming
a network latency of 50ms, the latency of using CKS is in the same
order of magnitude as using a local key on the device, and should
not be noticeable to the user.
7 KEY STORAGE COMPARISON
To compare different approaches for securely storing personal cryp-
tographic keys, we develop a comparative evaluation framework
that considers aspects of security and functionality. Using this
framework we analysed several common approaches, in compar-
ison with our new CKS approach. The results are summarized
in Table 2. In this table, a filled circle (•) indicates that the ap-
proach fully defends against the specified attack or fully provides
the respective functionality. An unfilled circle (◦) means that the
approach partially supports the feature, whilst a dash (−) shows
that the approach is vulnerable to the attack, or does not provide
that functionality.
Table 2: Comparison of key storage approaches
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Security
Secure environment - - • • • •
Resist offline guessing - - • • • •
Resist online guessing ◦ • • • •
Functionality
No additional hardware • • - ◦ - •
Multi-device use - • ◦ - ◦ •
Recovery - ◦ - - - •
Auditability - - - - - •
Time-bounded delegation - - ◦ - ◦ •
Use-bounded delegation - - - - - •
As shown in Table 2, the security considerations include: whether
the key is used within a secure environment; and whether the stored
keys are vulnerable to offline or online guessing attacks (e.g. of a
password). The functionality considerations include: whether an
approach requires additional hardware; whether the key can be
used from multiple devices; whether the user can recover from loss
of a device without having to revoke the key; whether the user can
audit the use of the key; and whether the user can delegate access
to the key for either a bounded duration or number of uses.
Note that in some cases, certain functionality could be pro-
vided by using application-specific mechanisms. For example, time-
bounded delegation could be achieved for PGP signing keys by
generating and signing a subkey for a limited duration. However,
we exclude these application-specific mechanisms from the frame-
work because they cannot be used in all cases (e.g. the subkey
approach cannot be used for decryption keys).
Password encrypted (local): Keys stored on the user’s local
device, even if encrypted with a password, are used directly by
the applications, which would not typically be considered a secure
environment. These keys are vulnerable to offline guessing attacks
against the password (online attacks are not applicable). In terms
of functionality, this approach does not require any additional or
specialized hardware, however, by default the key cannot be used
from multiple devices, cannot be recovered if lost, and cannot be
audited or delegated.
Password encrypted (cloud): The encrypted key is stored in
the cloud and downloaded to users’ devices when needed. Com-
pared to local storage, the security remains mostly unchanged,
except that partial protection against online guessing attacks may
be provided if the cloud server is trusted. In terms of functionality,
this allows the key to be used from multiple devices, and provides
partial recovery capabilities if the user’s device is lost but the pass-
word is not leaked. This approach does not provide centralized
auditability since the key is downloaded to the user’s device.
Smart card: As expected, a smart card provides significantly
better security guarantees: all operations take place in a secure envi-
ronment, and the smart card is designed to resist offline and online
guessing of the password or PIN. However, in terms of functionality,
smart cards themselves are additional hardware and also require a
smart card reader. A single smart card can be used from multiple
devices, provided they all have compatible readers. In general, the
device and smart card must be in the same physical location, so
protected keys cannot be used concurrently from two different
locations. Smart cards do not provide any recovery mechanism in
case of loss or damage. To some extent, smart cards can enable
time-bounded delegation: the key owner can give the smart card to
the delegatee, provided she receives it back at the agreed time.
Local hardware storage: Keys stored in e.g. the Android or iOS
device key stores enjoy similar protection to that of a smart card.
Although this approach does not require additional hardware, it
is not by default possible to use the keys from multiple devices or
delegate them to other users.
Hardware token: Secure hardware tokens like Trezor [33] and
YubiKey [37] are very similar to smart cards. Although they are by
definition additional hardware, they usually do not require readers,
like with smart cards.
Cloud Key Store In comparison, the CKS performs all opera-
tions within a secure environment, and resists offline and online
guessing attacks, as explained in Section 6.1. By design, the CKS
does not require additional hardware, and can be accessed from
multiple devices concurrently. As described in Section 4, the CKS
allows the key owner to audit all uses of the key and enables the
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user to recover from device loss without having to revoke the key.
Finally, the CKS allows secure revokable delegation of keys in either
a time-limited or use-limited fashion.
8 EXTENSIONS
8.1 Group keys
The user identities framework can be extended to include groups
of users. Similarly to delegating keys to other users, the group user
could set security policies on the group keys. The functions to add
and remove group members can be implemented in the same way
as the current delegation functions. Flexible per-user policies can
be combined with setting up per-group key policies. Then the use
of group keys can also be use-limited and time-limited.
8.2 Multiple passwords
The password authentication mechanism can be extended to sup-
port multiple passwords for each user. For example, the user can set
up different passwords for each of her devices. If one of the user’s
devices is lost, only the password for that device needs to be reset.
8.3 Multi-factor user authentication
The user authentication mechanism can also be extended to support
multi-factor authentication e.g. using the Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)
standard [10] or a one-time password (OTP) algorithm [27, 28]. This
would help to prevent misuse of a protected key if the user’s pass-
word is compromised. However, users who activate multi-factor
authentication would need to carry and use an additional authenti-
cation token or OTP generator app.
8.4 Trusted time server
In addition to the trusted time synchronization mechanism de-
scribed in Section 5, it would be possible to have the enclave contact
a trusted Network Time Protocol (NTP) server over a secure chan-
nel. This would allow the enclave to synchronize its local SGX time
to wall-clock time from the NTP server. When attesting the enclave,
users could verify that this process took place, and if the users also
trust the same NTP server, they can be assured the enclave has
been synchronized to the same time reference.
8.5 Backup, recovery, and scalability
Since availability is a critical concern, it should be possible to cre-
ate backups of the CKS key database and restore these on another
SGX-enabled machine, to mitigate against hardware failure. Ad-
ditionally, in a cloud setting, it is common to replicate a service
across multiple servers in order to achieve higher throughput and
better load balancing. Krawiecka et al. [21] faced a similar challenge
in terms of backup and scalability in the SafeKeeper system. The
solution they proposed was to run the same enclave on multiple
physical machines and perform mutual attestation between these
enclaves. The primary enclave can then replicate the sensitive data
(i.e. the CKS key database) across these different machines, without
reducing the security guarantees (since the enclaves are identical).
They proposed a simple consensus protocol that the enclaves could
use to agree on which replicas are active and which are backups. A
similar type of approach could be used to provide backup, recovery,
and scalability in CKS.
8.6 User-authorized migration
In a real-world deployment, the server operator may need to up-
grade to a newer version of the CKS enclave. However, in our
design, any changes to the enclave’s software will result in a differ-
ent enclave identity (MRENCLAVE value), and thus the new enclave
would not be able to unseal the database of passwords and protected
keys. Allowing the server operator to upgrade the enclave’s soft-
ware without authorization from the users could allow a malicious
or coerced operator to surreptitiously ‘upgrade’ to an enclave that
does not adequately protect users’ keys. To prevent this attack,
users must explicitly authorize any enclave software upgrade. For
example, this could be achieved using a new upgrade_cks com-
mand that authenticates the user via her password (as usual) and
includes the identity of the new enclave, which the user has verified
as being trustworthy. With this authorization, the old enclave could
attest the new enclave, confirm that its identity matches the user’s
authorization, and then transfer the user’s keys. This is similar to
the credential transfer protocol proposed by Kostiainen et al. [20],
but is slightly simpler because we assume both enclaves can be
online simultaneously.
9 RELATEDWORK
The idea of using TEEs for protecting secrets in the cloud has
gained significant attention. Major cloud providers often provide
key management services for their users [1, 14, 26]. These services
can be used to generate, store, and use cryptographic keys, without
exposing the keys to potentially untrusted software. Typically, keys
managed by such services are stored and used within a dedicated
Hardware Security Module (HSM). For example, the OpenStack
Barbican key management service provides a common API for
clients to manage secrets, including passwords, encryption keys,
and certificates. Barbican supports various back-ends, including
storing the secrets in an encrypted database or an HSM. To avoid
the performance and scalability limitations the HSM back-end,
Chakrabarti et al. [7] developed a new back-end based on Intel SGX.
Similarly, the Fortanix Self-Defending Key Management Service
(SDKMS) uses SGX to ensure users that the service provider does not
have access to their keys [12]. Both of these SGX-based approaches
also use remote attestation to provide assurance to remote verifiers.
However, these solutions are mainly focussed on managing secrets
used by cloud customers (e.g. secrets used by VMs running on the
provider’s cloud infrastructure).
In contrast, our Cloud Key Store is designed to be used by end-
users directly from their devices, and to provide user-centric capa-
bilities like key usage auditing and key delegation between users.
This is enabled in part by our use of password-based authentication
of end-users within the TEE. Balisane et al. [2] have previously dis-
cussed the idea of storing authentication templates (e.g. password
databases) inside a TEE. However, in their proposed architecture,
the server operator would still be able to capture a user-submitted
password in transit before it is input to the TEE. To avoid this, we
first establish an end-to-end secure channel between the user and
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the TEE, by performing a key agreement protocol that is unilater-
ally authenticated via the TEE’s remote attestation, as explained
in Section 4.1. This channel protects the password in transit, even
against a compromised server operator.
10 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We presented a Cloud Key Store (CKS) – the system that enables
users to use their keys from any device, without additional hard-
ware. Using Intel SGX, our implementation of the CKS protects
users’ keys against even a compromised server. To demonstrate
feasibility and evaluate performance, we integrated the CKS into
GnuPG on Linux and OpenKeychain on Android. The CKS achieves
the same strong security guarantees as smart cards or hardware
tokens, whilst providing enhanced functionality like delegation and
auditing. Our performance evaluation shows that the CKS through-
put is high and the latency is in the same order of magnitude as local
key storage. As future work we plan to investigate new additional
features that could be realized as part of the CKS. For example, if a
key has been generated within the CKS, the user could be given the
ability to provably but temporarily lock the key, thus preventing
even herself from using the key during the specified time period.
This could be useful from a legal perspective since a user can prove
that she will not have access to the key until a specified time point
in the future (e.g. preventing decryption of data encrypted under
that key until a future date).
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